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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
R.T. MARTEN, ] 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
BRIANHEAD ENTERPRISES, INC., 
and BURTON K. NICHOLS, 
individually, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
I Case No. 890736-CA 
Priority 14b 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a judgment entered on August 17, 1989, in 
the Fifth Judicial District Court, Iron County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable J. Philip Eves presiding. 
Appellant did not designate the Court to which this appeal is 
taken (See Rule 3(d) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court) in 
either the Notice of Appeal, filed September 15, 1989, or the 
Amended Notice of Appeal, filed September 18, 198 9. However, the 
Utah Supreme Court apparently received the file and then transferred 
the case to the Utah Court of Appeals on or about December 15, 1989. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE FOR REVIEW 
Is there substantial record evidence to support the Trial 
Court's factual finding that the Promissory Note dated June 15, 
M44/3 
19 8 0, was an element of the entire agreement between the parties, 
which also included a payment of cash, a trade of land and a trade 
of stock in Brianhead Enterprises, Inc., and was not merged into, 
replaced by, or reduced by a payment of money to Respondent that 
preceded the date of the Note. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
As this appeal has apparently been limited by Appellant to a 
review of the Trial Court's findings and judgment in order to 
determine whether the factual findings are supported by the record 
evidence, there are no constitutional provisions, statutes, 
ordinances or rules which are determinative. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant's statement of the case completely ignores 
his responsibility in an appeal of this nature as articulated in 
Harline v. Campbell, 728 P.2d. 980 (Utah 1986). Appellant did not 
even discuss the facts that would support the Court's findings and 
judgment let alone "marshal all of the evidence in support of the 
trial court's findings and...then demonstrate that even when viewed 
in the light most favorable to the factual determination made by the 
trial court, that the evidence is insufficient to support its 
finding." 728 P.2d. at 982. Accordingly, Respondent has elected to 
include his own statement of the case. 
1. In late 1977 or early 1978, Appellant approached the 
partners of Marvasnic, a limited partnership, with an offer to buy 
the principal asset of that limited partnership, real property 
referred to as the "Burt Dalley" property, at the price of $600.00 
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per acre or in exchange for stock in Brianhead Enterprises, Inc. 
(Transcript of Trial at 67). That offer was not satisfactory to the 
Plaintiff (Transcript of Trial at 68) and was not accepted by 
Marvasnic. 
2. On or about February 23, 1980, Brianhead Enterprises and 
Appellant, as it's President, submitted another offer to buy the 
Burt Dalley property for $1,000.00 per acre or $1,640,000.00 
(Transcript of Trial at 49) on terms which included a $1,000.00 
deposit, included as part of a $90,000.00 earnest money to be paid 
on or before March 15, 1980, and another payment due June 15, 1980, 
of $410,000.00. (Transcript of Trial at 49 through 50; Exhibit P-5 
at page 88 of the Record on Appeal) . 
3. After making that offer, Appellant approached Respondent 
and the other individual partners in Marvasnic with an alternative 
to payment of money for purchase of the property from Marvasnic 
(Transcript of Trial at 51 and 55-56). Appellant's proposal to 
Respondent was to acquire Respondent's partnership interest in 
Marvasnic. (Transcript of Trial at 56) . 
4. There was initially some discussion about payment of some 
cash to Respondent and a trade of some Brianhead Enterprises stock 
to Respondent but the parties disagreed on the value to be assigned 
to the stock. (Transcript of Trial at 52). 
5. Although there was a conflict in the testimony presented 
concerning what transpired after those initial discussions, 
Respondent testified that Appellant represented to him that 
Appellant intended to trade the stock in Brianhead Enterprises at 
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the same value as had been contemplated in the ecirlier offer to 
acquire the property which had been rejected. (Transcript of Trial 
at 52-53) . 
6. Respondent testified that since the stock exchange 
agreement was basically the same deal as had been proposed in 1978, 
and rejected (Transcript of Trial at 70 and 101) that he demanded 
and Appellant agreed that Respondent would be paid the money that he 
had put into Marvasnic in the interim (Transcript of Trial at 70). 
7. Respondent testified that he agreed to accept, for his 
interest in Marvasnic, $25,000.00 in cash, eight acres of real 
property, some stock in Brian Head Enterprises and reimbursement for 
a portion of the money that he had paid to or on behalf of Marvasnic 
since the initial offer to buy the Burt Dalley property had been 
made and rejected. (Transcript of Trial at 14-15; 52-53). 
8. Although Appellant offered no explanation as to how he and 
Respondent arrived at the figure of $26,754.00 as the principal 
amount on the Promissory Note, and claimed that the $25,000.00 cash 
payment was a "pre-payment of the Note", (Transcript of Trial at 83) 
that testimony was contradicted by Respondent who testified that he 
had agreed to accept a transfer of the stock in Brian Head 
Enterprises, Inc., only if he was compensated for the money that he 
had put into Marvasnic during the previous year (Transcript at 15). 
9. Respondent testified that the Note amount had been 
calculated by totaling the money that Respondent had paid into or on 
behalf of the Marvasnic partnership in 1978 and 1979, in the amount 
of $22,300.00, plus interest on that amount at 10% per annum for 1.4 
years, in the amount of $3,122.00, for a total of $25,422.00. 
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(Transcript of Trial at 15-17). That amount of $25,422.00 had been 
divided by 25.25, Respondent's total number of shares owned in 
Marvasnic, Ltd., (Transcript of Trial at 20) for a per share amount 
of $1,006.81. (Transcript of Trial at 18). That per share amount 
was then multiplied by 18.13, the number of shares that Respondent 
anticipated he would be trading for stock in Brianhead Enterprises, 
for a total of $18,253.94 (Transcript of Trial at 18), to which was 
added the amount that Respondent had paid to or on behalf of 
Marvasnic, Ltd., in 1980, in the amount of $8,500.00, for a total of 
$26,753.94. When rounded to the nearest dollar, that amount was 
$26,754.00, the amount of the Promissory Note. (Transcript of Trial 
at 18-19) . Although Respondent testified that that was the method 
utilized to calculate the principal amount of the Promissory Note, 
Respondent did acknowledge that there were some changes made to the 
final documents in order to accommodate accounting and tax concerns. 
(Transcript of Trial at 30) . 
10. Respondent testified that Appellant was present during 
calculation of the principal amount of the Promissory Note and 
agreed to the face amount of the Promissory Note as reimbursement 
for the contributions made to or on behalf of Marvasnic by 
Respondent during 1979 and 1980. (Transcript of Trial at 20). 
11. Respondent also testified that he negotiated essentially 
the same arrangement for Sam Jeromin, that is, that Mr. Jeromin 
would be reimbursed for his contributions. (See Plaintiff's Exhibit 
No. 2 at Page 85 of the Record) . That Note was assigned to 
Respondent. (Transcript of Trial at 25; Exhibit No. P-3 at Page 86 
of the Record). 
12. Respondent testified that Appellant signed the Note two 
times, once as President of Brianhead Enterprises, Inc., and once 
personally, and that no payments had been received on either that 
Note, Exhibit No. 1 at page 84 of the Record, or the Sam Jeromin 
Note, Exhibit 2 at Page 85 of the Record (Transcript of Trial at 
10-12) . 
13. Appellant maintained at trial that, although the Note was 
dated June 15, 1980, he had delivered the Note to Respondent prior 
to that time. However, he could not explain why he would have done 
so when asked by the Trial Court for an explanation. (Transcript of 
Trial at 86). 
14. There was testimony offered at Trial with reference to the 
dates on which several documents had been signed. Appellant 
maintained that although the Bills of Sale representing the exchange 
of stock and land bore the date June 15, 1980, (Record at 92 and 94) 
the real property Respondent was to receive was not conveyed until 
July 16, 1980, over a month later. (Transcript at 90). With regard 
to that aspect of the transfer, Respondent testified that the Bill 
of Sale, although it might have been dated June 15, 1980, at the 
time he signed it, was not signed or delivered until after 
Respondent had received the Deed to the land that was included in 
the transaction. (Transcript at 100). 
15. The Bill of Sale reflecting receipt of $25,000.00, bears 
the date of June 6, 1980, (Record at 91), the same date as the check 
written to Respondent in that amount. (Defendant's Exhibit No. 1, 
Record at 90). 
16. In response to Appellant's allegations concerning timing 
of the transaction between the parties, Respondent denied receiving 
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the Promissory Note prior to June 6, 1980, (Transcript at 98), 
acknowledged that the Note may have been signed on that date 
(Transcript of Trial at 28) and maintained that he had received the 
$25,000.00 check on June 6, 1980. (Transcript of Trial at 29 and 
98) . 
17. Respondent also claimed that Defendant's Exhibit No. 2, 
the Bill of Sale reflecting the stock trade, was received some time 
after June 6, 1980, (Transcript of Trial at 98) and that Exhibit No. 
3, the Bill of Sale reflecting the trade for real property, was not 
delivered until after Respondent received the Deed to the real 
property, dated July 16, 1980, (Record at 95; Transcript of Trial at 
99-100). 
18. Respondent testified that the Note for $26,754.00, 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1 at Page 84 of the Record) was the 
consideration for Respondent's Agreement to trade part of his 
interest in Marvasnic, Ltd., for stock in Brianhead Enterprises at 
the same exchange rate as had been proposed in the 1978 offer to buy 
the Marvasnic property which had been rejected. (Transcript of 
Trial at 57). 
19. Prior to Trial, Respondent had made a Motion in Limine 
requesting that the Court rule, as a matter of law, that the check 
for $25,000.00 could not be considered payment on the Promissory 
Note since 1) it pre-dated the Promissory Note and 2) any allegation 
of prior payment should be excluded based on the parol-evidence rule 
since it would, in effect, be modifying the terms of a document 
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which on its face appeared to be complete. That matter was taken 
under advisement and, later during trial, denied. The Trial Court 
said: "It's clear to me that the documents which have been presented 
in this case do not encompass the entire agreement. . .and there are 
ambiguities in those documents which would necessitate a resort to 
parol evidence. This is not an all-inclusive agreement. We're just 
dealing with a series of notes and receipts. And so...obviously 
we're going to have to rely on parol evidence." (Transcript of 
Trial at 65) . 
20. The Trial Court did not believe Appellant's version of 
what happened and rendered judgment for Respondent for principal, 
interest, and attorney's fees on the Note admitted as Exhibit P-l, 
and principal, interest and attorney's fees on the Sam Jeromin Note, 
Exhibit P-2, which had been assigned to Respondent, plus after 
accruing attorney's fees (Transcript of Trial at 117-119). Findings 
and a Judgment were prepared and, consistent with that ruling, 
entered on August 17, 1989, (Record at 97-102). This appeal 
followed (Record at 103-109). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant's Brief ignores the appropriate standard of review in 
an appeal of this nature. There is substantial evidence in the 
record to support the Trial Court's findings. 
The Trial Court correctly found that there Wcis no "integration" 
in this matter which would preclude enforcement of the Promissory 
Note. The Promissory Note was an integral element of the entire 
transaction between the parties whereby Respondent agreed to 
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sell and Appellant agreed, on behalf of Brianhead Enterprises, 
Inc., to buy Respondent's interest in Marvasnic, Ltd., with 
Appellant personally agreeing to payment of the Promissory Note out 
of which this litigation arises. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT THE 
TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE PROMISSORY NOTE OUT OF WHICH THIS 
LITIGATION ARISES WAS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE TRANSACTION INVOLVING 
RESPONDENT'S AGREEMENT TO SELL HIS INTEREST IN MARVASNIC, LTD. 
In Harline v. Campbell, 728 P.2d. 980 (Utah 1986), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
"Under familiar rules of appellate review, the Court 
views the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
judgment of the trial court, and the findings of the trial 
court will not be disturbed unless there is no substantial 
record evidence to support them. It is incumbent upon the 
appellant to marshall all of the evidence in support of 
the trial court's findings and to then demonstrate that 
even when viewed in the light most favorable to the 
factual determination made by the trial court, that the 
evidence is insufficient to support its findings." 728 
P.2d at 982. 
In this instance Appellant has totally ignored his 
responsibility to marshall evidence in support of the Trial Court's 
findings and then demonstrate that, even when viewed in the light 
most favorable to the factual determination by the Trial Court, the 
evidence is insufficient to support its findings. 
Appellant cites only those references to the record which 
support his arguments on appeal. A more complete review of the 
record clearly indicates that the findings of the Trial Court are 
substantially supported by the record. 
The Trial Court, in this case, was asked to resolve a conflict 
between the testimony of two witnesses. Appellant claimed that a 
$25,000.00 check delivered on June 6, 1980, was a discounted, 
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pre-payment of a Note dated June 15, 1980, which had been delivered 
to and left with Respondent despite the claimed payment in full. 
(Transcript at 83). 
Respondent, on the other hand, testified that the Promissory 
Note was intended to compensate him for contributions he had made to 
or on behalf of Marvasnic since the date on which Appellant had made 
an offer to purchase Marvasnic!s principal asset, the Burt Dalley 
property, or exchange stock for that property. (Transcript at 14-15, 
52-53) . Respondent testified that he demanded that he be reimbursed 
for those expenses since the stock trade offered in 1980 was 
essentially the same as had been made and rejected, approximately 
two years prior. (Transcript at 52-53,70 and 101). Respondent 
demanded that he be reimbursed for money he had spent out-of-pocket 
to fund Marvasnic if he was going to accept stock for his interest 
in Marvasnic at the same rate and on the same terms as had been 
previously rejected. (Transcript at 70). Respondent demonstrated to 
the Court how the principal amount of the Promissory Note had been 
calculated. (Transcript at 15-20). That testimony was entirely 
consistent with the balance of the transaction between the parties, 
including the Bill of Sale dated June 6, 1980, reflecting that a 
certain number of shares in Marvasnic had been sold for the face 
amount of the check, not the face amount of the Promissory Note. 
(Exhibit D-l at page 90-91 of the Record). 
Based on the evidence presented the Trial Court concluded that 
Respondent's testimony was consistent with the documents and other 
evidence presented whereas Appellant's testimony was not. The Trial 
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Court did not believe Appellant, did believe Respondent, and 
properly determined, from the evidence presented, that judgment 
should be rendered for Respondent. There is substantial evidence in 
the record to support that decision and the Trial Courtfs factual 
findings in that regard should not be disturbed on appeal. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE BILLS OF SALE 
WERE NOT INTENDED TO REPLACE THE PROMISSORY NOTE BUT, INSTEAD, WERE 
INTENDED TO BE AN INTEGRAL PART OF AN AGREEMENT WHICH INCLUDED THE 
PROMISSORY NOTE. 
The only legal question that appears to have been raised by 
Appellant is whether or not the Trial Court should have determined 
that the Promissory Note was replaced by the three Bills of Sale. 
That is the only issue of law as to which any argument is offered in 
Appellant's Brief. Appellant's use of the term "individually" as it 
relates to Appellant's liability on the Promissory Note, might 
suggest that another issue would have been raised and argued. 
However, since neither the Docketing Statement nor Appellant's Brief 
questions the Trial Court's determination that Appellant is 
personally liable on the Promissory Note which he 
signed individually and as President of Brianhead Enterprises, 
Inc., that issue will not be addressed in Respondent's Brief, and 
Respondent specifically objects to any effort made by Appellant to 
raise that issue at this point in the proceedings. In addition, 
Appellant's Brief does not contest the award in favor of Respondent 
with relationship to the "Sam Jeromin" Note. Issues relating to 
judgment on that Note will therefore also not be addressed in 
Respondent's Brief. 
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According to §228 of the Re-statement of Contracts, as cited 
with approval in Bullfrog Marina Inc., v. Lentz, 501 P.2d. 266 (Utah 
1972) 
"An agreement is integrated where the parties thereto 
adopt a writing or writings as the final and complete 
expression of the agreement. An integration Is the 
writing or the writings so adopted." 
However, the court acknowledged that §228 goes on to explain 
that integrated contracts must be distinguished from the written 
memoranda by which those contracts may be proved. 
"An essential element of an integration is that the 
parties shall have manifested asset not merely to the 
provisions of their agreement but to the writing or 
writings in question as a final statement of their 
intentions as to the matters contained therein. Whether a 
document was or was not adopted as an integration may be 
proved by any relevant evidence." 501 P.2d at 2 70. 
In this case, since there was no objection raised by Appellant 
as to the admissibility of parole evidence concerning the alleged 
"integration", Appellant has apparently agreed that the evidence 
presented was appropriately considered by the Court in determining 
the terms of the parties1 contractual agreement. 
In support of Appellant's apparent argument that the three 
3ills of Sale should be read as an integrated contract to the 
exclusion of the Promissory Note, despite the substantial testimony 
and evidence presented at trial that the Promissory Note was an 
Integral part of the parties1 contractual agreement, Appellant cites 
three cases: Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 671 P. 2d 182 
(Utah 1983), Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 501 P.2d 266 (Utah 
1972) and Strike v. White, 63 P.2d 600 (Utah 1936). Neither of the 
three cases support the conclusion suggested by Appellant in this 
natter. 
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In Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc.f the plaintiff had 
agreed to sell shares of stock to the defendants for $100,000.00 and 
the parties signed a promissory note for that amount. Subsequently, 
the parties entered into a written agreement for the sale and 
purchase of the stock. That agreement contained numerous provisions 
similar to those contained in the promissory note. The agreement, 
the shares, and the promissory note were all placed in escrow. 
The defendant paid to the plaintiff a portion of the purchase 
price but did not complete payment and so the plaintiff sued the 
defendant on the promissory note. The trial court determined that 
the written agreement was an integration and that therefore the 
Promissory Note- was superseded by that written agreement. In 
upholding that decision the Supreme Court stated: 
"The implication that arises from the note and the 
agreement when read together is that the promissory note 
was prepared in anticipation of the more complete November 
agreement and that the latter was intended to supersede 
the note. Furthermore, correspondence between the 
parties' attorneys indicates that the November agreement 
was intended to be the final settlement of a controversy 
between the parties." 671 P.2d at 183. 
The Supreme Court acknowledged that there was one fact in 
support of the plaintiff's position that the written agreement was 
not an integration: the promissory note was placed in escrow 
together with the agreement and the stock. However, the Supreme 
Court held that there was other sufficient evidence to support the 
trial court's finding that there was an integration and so the 
decision of the trial court was affirmed. In reaching that 
conclusion the Trial Court considered two basic rules of law: 
(1) "Whether a written agreement is an integrated 
agreement and supersedes a prior written agreement depends 
upon the intent of the parties." 671 P.2d at 183. 
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and 
(2) "In determing whether an agreement was intended 
to supersede a prior agreement, a court may consider 
extrinsic evidence as to the circumstances of the 
transaction, including the purpose for which the contested 
agreement was made." 671 P.2d at 183. 
The Supreme Court ultimately reasoned that: 
"Since the issue of whether a contract is integrated is a 
factual question, the trial court's determination will be 
sustained on appeal if there is substantial evidence to 
support it." 671 P.2d. at 183. 
The decision of the trial court was affirmed. 
In Bullfrog Marina Inc., v. Lentz, the court allowed 
parol-testimony to show the circumstances under which the agreement, 
claimed to be an integrated contract, was made and to show the 
purpose for which the instrument was executed. After fully 
considering the entire transaction the Court concluded that the 
lease agreement and employment contract in dispute should be 
considered as one agreement. As in the Ringwood case the Supreme 
Court determined that: 
"Since the issue of whether the lease was an integration 
was a factual question, and there was substantial evidence 
to support the determination of the trial judge, his 
findings must be sustained." 501 P.2d at 270-271. 
The court went on to state: 
"The trial court did not err in following the rule of law 
that where two or more instruments are executed by the 
same parties contemporaneously, or at different times in 
the course of the same transaction, and concern the same 
subject matter, they will be read and construed together 
so far as determining the respective rights and interests 
of the parties, although they do not in terms refer to 
each other." 501 P.2d at 271. 
In Strike v. White, the Supreme Court acknowledged that: 
"It is an elementary rule of evidence that a written 
contract which is definite, certain, and complete in its 
terms may not be varied by parole evidence." 6 3 P. 2d at 
602. 
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However, the Court went on to state: 
"Another well-established rule of law is that where two or 
more written instruments are executed as a part of one 
transaction such instruments should, when possible, be 
construed together." 63 P.2d at 602. 
The general rules of law found in the three cases cited by 
Appellant include: 1) extrinsic evidence should be considered in 
determining whether or not a document or documents are integrated 
and 2) if two or more written instruments are executed as part of 
one transaction they should be construed together. 
In the instant case, Respondent claimed at trial that there 
were four integral components of the contract between the parties 
and explained the purpose for each. Unlike the Ringwood case there 
was no written agreement which superseded any of those integral 
parts. However, as in the Bullfrog Marina case, there were multiple 
documents that should be construed together to determine the 
respective rights and interests of the parties. The Trial Court did 
exactly that: the four written documents were considered together. 
The Trial Court concluded that, as a matter of fact, the contract 
between the parties included an agreement by Brianhead Enterprises, 
Inc., and Appellant individually, to pay Respondent a portion of the 
money that he had paid to or on behalf of Marvasnic since rejection 
of the initial offer to purchase the Burt Dalley property and that 
Respondent only agreed to sell his interest in Marvasnic upon 
Appellant's agreement to pay that money. 
Appellant claims in his brief that the documents, apparently 
the Bills of Sale, do not refer to an unpaid Promissory Note for 
future payment. That is entirely true. However, the purpose of 
allowing extrinsic evidence at trial in this case, and any case 
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involving a claimed integration, is to determine whether or not a 
specific provision of the agreement between the parties, in this 
case, the Promissory Note, should be construed together with the 
balance of the agreement, in this case the three Bills of Sale. The 
Court considered all of the evidence and correctly ruled in favor of 
Respondent in that regard. 
In reaching its factual determination that the contract between 
the parties consisted of four elements, including a cash payment of 
$25,000.00 and a Promissory Note for $26,754.00, the Trial Court 
ruled against Appellant's claim that the $25,0 00.00 should be 
credited as a payment on the Promissory Note. The Trial Court 
expressly determined that the Note and the payment were separate 
components of one agreement. Insofar as there was a dispute in the 
evidence, the Trial Court resolved the dispute in favor of 
Respondent determining that Respondent's evidence was the more 
credible. The Trial Court was entitled to do so. It did no more 
than fulfill its responsibility to ascertain the truth. Therefore, 
no credit should be allowed against the Promissory Note by reason of 
the $25,000.00 cash payment. Each was an essential element of a 
contract which required that Appellant reimburse Respondent for 
payments to or on behalf of Marvasnic over the previous 
approximately two years and that Respondent receive some cash, some 
land and receive some stock in Brianhead Enterprises, Inc. 
CONCLUSION 
The entire transaction between Respondent, Brianhead 
Enterprises, Inc., and Appellant, consisted of a purchase from 
Respondent of a 25.25% interest in Marvasnic together with a promise 
to re-pay Respondent for monies paid to or on behalf of Marvasnic 
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since an offer made to purchase Marvasnic's principal asset had been 
made by Appellant and rejected• The documents and the testimony 
support that conclusion. Except for Appellant's testimony, which 
the Trial Court did not believe, there was no evidence to support 
Appellant's claim that the Promissory Note was merged into or 
superseded by any of the Bills of Sale or the check for $25,000.00 
nor was there evidence to support Appellant's claim that the 
$25,000.00 was intended by the parties as a payment on the Note. 
The Trial Court ruled correctly based on the evidence 
presented. There is substantial record evidence to support the 
Trial Court's conclusions. Accordingly, the decision of the Trial 
Court should be affirmed and the Respondent should be awarded his 
costs and attorney's fees incurred in defending and responding to 
this appeal. 
DATED this // " day of April, 1990. 
GALLIAN & WESTFALL 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies of 
Respondent's Brief on the /f£L~ day of April, 1990, to the 
following: 
Michael W. Park 
James M. Park 
P.O. Box 2438 




Loan No PROMISSORY NOTE 
$. .2A\Z^.\°P..... June ^ 15
 9 19.8.0. . 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned promise(s) to pay to 
R. T. Marten 
or order* . • A^A^r.sA^ thousand,# seven, hundred m fif$#££$&, ($ .2&\Z&*PP. ..) 
together with interest from date at the rate of t*f?iY? .per cent, (..A^ ...%) 
per annum on the unpaid balance payable as follows, viz: 
All due and payable March 15, 1981, 
in lawful money of the United States of America, negotiable and payable at 
the office of JU .T... flw*.eRf. ±&. 9$h*.S&99U.V*lMXi .to . SZQkX 
without defalcation or discount. All payments hereinabove provided for 
shall be applied first on accrued interest and-balance-to reduction of 
principal. Any installments of principal and interest not paid when due 
shall, at the option of the legal holder hereof, bear interest thereafter 
at the rate of twelve per annum until paid. 
In case of default in the payment of any installment of principal or 
interest as herein stipulated, then it shall be optional with the legal 
holder of this note to declare the entire principal sum hereof due and 
payable; and proceedings may at once be instituted for the recovery of 
the same by law, with accrued interest and costs, including reasonable 
attorney's fees. 
The makers and endorsers severally waive presentment, protest and 
demand; and waive notice of protest, demand and of dishonor and non-
payment of this note, and expressly agree that this note, or any payment 
thereunder, may be extended from time to time without in any way 
effecting the liability of the makers and endorsers thereof. 
Burton K. Nichols, President 
Brian Head Enterprises, Inc. 
00008'i 
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GALLIAN & WESTFALL 
G. Michael Westfall #3434 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
ONE SOUTH MAIN STREET 
DIXIE STATE BANK BUILDING 
P. 0. Box 367 
S T . GEORGE, UTAH 8 477 0 
(801) 6 2 8 - 1 6 8 2 
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 0EP)JT> 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
R. T. MARTEN, 
VS. 
Plaintiff, 
BRIAN HEAD ENTERPRISES, INC. 
a Utah corporation, and 
BURTON K. NICHOLS, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 87-95 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court for trial on 
Friday the 4th day of August, 1989. Present were the Plaintiff and 
his counsel, G. Michael Westfall of the law firm of GALLIAN & 
WESTFALL and the Defendant and his counsel, Michael W. Park. Both 
parties were sworn and testified. Exhibits were marked and 
introduced. From the evidence presented the Court entered Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Based thereon the Court ORDERS, 
ADJUDGES and DECREES as follows: 
1. Judgment is hereby entered in favor of the Plaintiff and 
against the Defendant, Burton K. Nichols, in the amount of 
Ml/12 
00009? 
$64,099.16, including principal, accrued interest, and attorney's 
fees, plus costs in the amount of $364.50, said judgment to accrue 
interest at the rate of 12% per annum. 
2. It is further ordered that this Judgment shall be augmented 
in the amount of reasonable costs and attorney's fees expended in 
collecting said judgment, by execution or otherwise, as shall be 
established by Affidavit. 
DATED this /ST - day of August, 1989. 
BY THE COURT:: 
Philip E ^ 
strict Court Judge 




GALLIAN & WESTFALL 
G. Michael Westfall #3434 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
R. T. MARTEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRIAN HEAD ENTERPRISES, INC. 
a Utah corporation, and 
BURTON K. NICHOLS, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 87-95 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court for trial on 
the scheduled date of Friday the 4th day of August, 1989. Present 
were the Plaintiff and his counsel, G. Michael Westfall of the law 
firm of GALLIAN & WESTFALL and the Defendant and his counsel, 
Michael W. Park. Both parties were sworn and testified. Exhibits 
were marked and introduced. Based on the evidence presented the 
Court, based on the preponderance of the evidence, makes the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Promissory Note introduced as Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1 
was signed by the Defendant both as President of Brian Head 
Ml/11 00009a 
Enterprises, Inc., and also personally as a co-maker on the Note. 
2. The Promissory Note (Plaintiff1s Exhibit "I") was signed in 
conjunction with Plaintiff's agreement to sell to Brian Head 
Enterprises, Inc. Plaintiff's interest as a limited and general 
partner in "Marvasnic", a limited partnership. 
3. The Note was signed by Defendant as a premise to reimburse 
Plaintiff for money paid by Plaintiff on behalf of Marvasnic in 1979 
and to reimburse to Plaintiff a portion of his 1978 Marvasnic 
assessment and as an inducement to Plaintiff to sell his interest in 
Marvasnic to Brian Head Enterprises, Inc. 
4* Other aspects of Plaintiff's agreement to convey his 
interest _in _Marvasnic included Plaintiff's agreement to accept 
$25,000.00 in cash, eight acres of real property and stock in Brian 
Head Enterprises, Inc. 
5. The Promissory Note was not delivered to Plaintiff prior to 
his receipt of the $25,000.00 cash payment. 
6. The $25,000.00 was not a payment on the Note. 
7. Despite demand the Plaintiff has received no payment from 
either Defendant on the Note. 
8. Interest accrued on the Note, at the agreed upon rate of 
12% per annum, as of the date of trial, is $29,334.32. 
9. The Defendant, Burton K. Nichols, signed Plaintiff's 
Exhibit No. 2, the "Sam Jeromin Note", personally agreeing to pay to 
Sam Jeromin the sum of $2,000.00 on March 15, 1981. 
10. The Sam Jeromin Note, although it indicates that the 
obligation was due March 15, 1980, erroneously listed that date. The 
actual due date was March 15, 1981. 
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11. Sam Jeromin assigned the Note to Plaintiff for good and 
valuable consideration. 
12. The interest due on the "Sam Jeromin Note", from March 15, 
1981 until May 12, 1981, at the rate of 6% per annum, is $19.14 and 
from May 12, 1981, until the date of trial, at the legal rate of 10% 
per annum, is $1,646.20. 
13. Plaintiff is the prevailing party for the purpose of 
assessing costs. 
14. A reasonable attorney's fee incurred in this matter up to 
the date of trial is $4,525.50. 
Based on the foregoing the Court makes and enters the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Defendant, Burton K. Nichols, is personally obligated on 
the Note dated June 15, 1980, and introduced as Plaintiff's Exhibit 
"1". 
2. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment on his First Cause of 
Action against Defendant, Burton K. Nichols, in the amount of 
$55,908.32, including interest at the rate of 12% per annum from and 
after June 15, 1980, until the date of trial. 
3. Plaintiff, as assignee of the Sam Jeromin Note, is entitled 
to judgment on_ Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action against the 
Defendant in the amount of $3,665.34, including interest at the 
highest legal rate from March 15, 1981, until the date of trial. 
4. Plaintiff is entitled to his attorney's fees incurred to 
the date of trial in the amount of $4,525.50, together with after 
accruing fees. 
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5. Plaintiff is entitled to costs incurred in the amount of 
$364.50, as evidenced by memorandum submitted pursuant to the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, together with after accruing costs. 
6. Plaintiff is entitled to a total judgment against the 
Defendant in the amount of $64,099.16, plus costs, the same to bear 
interest at the rate of 12% per annum until paid in full. 
(ri£ DATED this /j> ^ day of August, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
C&<s64~. 
Jy^Philip Eves 
^strict Cour£ Judge 
Approved as to form 
and content: 
Michael W. Pari 
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